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Abstract 
Economists stress the leading role that inclusive institutions play among the various factors that 
foster a country’s economic growth. In this article, we show that it might be misleading to 
mistake the codification of a formal rule for its effective administrative implementation. As the 
case of the German state Wuerttemberg demonstrates, a government’s lip service to the 
principle of equal treatment does not guarantee that the local patent authority refrains from 
discriminating against foreign patentees by charging comparatively high patent fees. We 
conclude that the introduction of a stringent and formally fair patent law alone does not 
guarantee that foreign inventors’ intellectual property rights are protected as well as those of 
the domestic patentees. 
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Introduction 
Economists stress the leading role that inclusive institutions play among the various 
factors that foster a country’s economic development and growth. In this article, we show that 
it might be misleading to mistake the codification of a formal rule for its effective 
implementation. Our case in point is the formal introduction of the principle of national 
treatment into the patent laws of the German states. In 1842, the participants of the German 
customs union, the Zollverein, agreed on treating the inventors from all member states equally 
under each state-specific patent law. As the administrative practice of the Southwestern German 
state Wuerttemberg demonstrates, however, a government’s lip service to the principle of equal 
treatment does not guarantee that the local patent authority really refrains from discriminating 
against foreign patentees. Trying to catch-up to more advanced German states such as Saxony 
or Prussia in the second half of the 19th century, Wuerttemberg decided to break codified rules 
to which the other states adhered. We conclude that the introduction of a stringent and formally 
fair patent law alone does not guarantee that foreign inventors’ intellectual property rights are 
protected as well as those of the domestic patentees. 
Following Douglass C. North’s path-breaking contribution, economists (North/Thomas, 
1973; North/Weingast, 1989; North, 1990; DeLong/Shleifer, 1993, 
Acemoglu/Johnson/Robinson, 2001; North/Wallis/Weingast 2009; Acemoglu/Robinson, 2012) 
interpret the establishment of inclusive institutions that guarantee free market access, secure 
property rights and reduce transaction costs as a necessary precondition for sustained economic 
growth. To prove the causal nexus between the quality of institutions and economic 
performance for the German industrialization, Acemoglu et al. (2011) analyze the long-term 
impact of the Napoleon-led French occupation of states in Northwestern and Western Germany 
that came along with radical institutional change such as the abolition of guilds and serfdom or 
the introduction of a civil legal code. The authors conclude that the longer a German state was 
under French rule the more firmly the new inclusive institutions became anchored in the 
German society and the higher was therefore subsequent economic growth. Based on these 
findings, Donges, Meier and Silva (2018) try to identify the channel through which the 
institutional reform influenced economic development the most. Using data about the 
distribution of valuable patents across German regions after 1877 (Streb/Baten/Yin, 2006), they 
observe that German counties with the longest period of French occupation had more than twice 
as many valuable patents per capita than unoccupied German counties that stuck to their 
traditional institutions for some additional time. That is why Donges, Meier and Silva (2018) 
claim that inclusive institution are a first order determinant of innovation and therefore growth. 
  
Most scholars who emphasis the positive effects of the codification of inclusive 
institutions implicitly assume that the administration will enforce them effectively. This is not 
something to be taken for granted. One the one hand, bureaucrats might be unwilling to 
implement the new rules because they still cling to the old ways of misusing their discretionary 
power for their personal benefit. Selgert (2018) discusses for the case of the German state 
Baden, which had also been under French occupation, how the Grand Duke of Baden 
established an efficient and uncorrupt administration in the decade after Napoleon’s defeat. On 
the other hand, bureaucrats might not be allowed to enforce the new rules because their 
superiors have ordered them to follow instructions that are opposed to the official law. A case 
in point is the principal of national treatment found in every modern patent law that many patent 
authorities have disobeyed in the past. 
To give local firms the opportunity to imitate foreign innovations at low cost, backward 
countries have always been tempted to discriminate against foreign inventors from more 
advanced countries. Antebellum America provides a classic example for a country that openly 
favored domestic inventors (Khan, 2005, p. 57). Initially, the US Patent Statute of 1793 had 
limited the right to acquire a US patent to American citizens alone. In the following decades, 
this discriminatory provision was relaxed to the extent that foreigners with permanent American 
residence became entitled to apply for an US patent too. The Patent Act of 1836 opened the 
American patent system finally also to foreign inventors living outside the US, who, however, 
had to pay a significantly higher patent fee than domestic inventors. Hard hit were above all the 
British inventors, who had to give $ 500 for an American patent while for all other nationalities 
a fee of $ 300 was enough.1 To make it comparatively expensive for British inventors to hold 
an American patent was not without economic logic. Since Great Britain was the 
technologically most advanced country of the early 19th century, American firms could profit 
the most from selling unprotected British innovations in their large home market. 
To what extent a domestic manufacturer profited from patent discrimination against 
foreigners depended largely upon the volume of its export activities because any additional 
profit a firm could get from preferential treatment at home could potentially be offset by a 
decrease in export gains that resulted from foreign retaliatory measures (Geng/Saggi, 2015, p. 
15). That is why open patent discrimination against foreigners became a less attractive policy 
measure during the second half of the 19th century, when globalization led to strongly increasing 
international trade flows (O’Rourke/Williamson, 1999). In an international attempt to end the 
era of patent discrimination the founding members Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, 
                                                             
1 American applicants had to pay a fee of only $ 30. 
  
the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland established the Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in March 1883. The United Kingdom 
joined this agreement in 1884, the Unites States of America in 1887, and Germany in 1903 
(Seckelmann, 2006, pp. 226-228).2 The most important outcome of the Paris Convention was 
the principle of national treatment that required that each national patent law treated domestic 
and foreign patent applicants equally.3 This rule has been retained until today. Notably, article 
3 of the Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) from April 
1994 confirms the Paris Convention and obliges all member states of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) to comply with the principle of national treatment.4 
Arguably, national governments decided to give up discriminating against foreigners 
and to join the Paris Convention because they assumed that their domestic industries would 
realize net gains from enjoying secure intellectual property rights in their various export 
markets. Even better than a world where everybody adheres to the principle of national 
treatment, however, is a world where everybody except oneself is doing so. Because written 
law could no longer comprise any formal discriminatory clauses, discrimination against 
foreigners had to manifest itself now in informal administrative or juridical procedures that 
outsiders could not easily observe (or prove). Webster et al. (2014) argue that patent examiners’ 
task to evaluate the inventiveness or non-obviousness of a patent application gives them the 
leeway in decision-making to prefer domestic inventors. Analyzing the examination practice of 
European and Japanese patent offices between 1990 and 1995, they find that domestic inventors 
are more likely to get a patent grant than foreign ones. Mai and Stoyanow (2014) assume that 
judges favor domestic firms in patent litigations. Based on information about the outcomes of 
all intellectual property rights litigations that took place in Canada between 2007 and 2010, 
they calculate that foreign firms face a smaller probability of winning the case. 
Another way to discriminate against foreigners is to delay their patent grants to give 
domestic inventors the time to gain a competitive edge by filing many improvements around 
the original foreign patent application (Kotabe, 1992). Richter and Streb (2011) show that the 
                                                             
2 Status April 2018, 177 states have joined the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 
3 The original Paris Convention was written in French. Article 2 reads: “Les sujets ou citoyens de chacun des 
États contractants jouiront, dans tous les autres États de l’Union, en ce qui concerne les brevets d’invention, les 
dessins ou modèles industriels, les marques de fabrique ou de commerce et le nom commercial, des 
advantages que les lois repectives accordant actuellement ou accorderont par la suite aux nationaux. En 
consequence, ils auront la même protection que ceux-ci et le même recours legal contre toute atteinte portée 
à leurs droits, sous reserve de l’accomplissement de formalités et des conditions imposes au nationaux par la 
legislation intérieure de chaque État.” The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) provides the 
original version of the Paris Convention in the historical archives of its homepage. 
4 <https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips-03_e.htm>, access on 15th June 2018. 
  
German patent authority obviously used this strategy to support the domestic machine tool 
industry in the 1920s when the review period for American filers took more than twice as long 
as for German ones. The problems American manufacturers faced in dealing with the German 
patent office is illustrated by the experience of Sol Einstein, head of the design engineering 
department of the Cincinnati Milling Machine Company: “It was difficult to get a German 
patent granted due to the opposition from German manufacturers. I therefore was sent to 
Germany to straighten out the difficulties our attorney experienced. When our opponents found 
out that I was in Germany to attend a hearing before the patent office, from month to month 
they postponed the hearings in the hope I would not stay in Germany. Finally, after three months 
of delaying, the hearing was set. […] Our opponents were willing to withdraw their position if 
we would grant them a license for using all twelve machines they had built. I insisted, however, 
on a ruling by the patent office, which finally granted the patent with very broad claims.” 
However, “through the united effort of a larger number of German companies, the patent, after 
four years in existence, was declared invalid.”5 
This was not the first case of discriminating against foreigners in the history of German 
patent administration. We will show in the following that the patent authority of the Kingdom 
of Wuerttemberg, which is today one of the most innovative and prosperous European regions6, 
chose in the 19th century a less subtle way to prefer local patentees by imposing significantly 
higher patent fees to foreign inventors. We will argue that this administrative practice was not 
easily observable and gave the patent authority therefore the freedom of action to discourage 
foreign inventors from seeking long-term patent protection in Wuerttemberg. To prove this 
claim we will first elaborate the patent law of Wuerttemberg and discuss the possible reasons 
why a foreign patentee had to pay higher patent fees than a local one. In the second step, we 
will provide statistical evidence to prove the hypothesis that discrimination against foreigners 
did take place in Wuerttemberg. 
 
The patent law of Wuerttemberg 
Before 1877, no nation-wide patent law existed in Germany. Instead, the larger German 
states had established their own state-specific patent laws that differed considerably with 
respect to the examination procedure and the patent fees demanded (Donges/Selgert 2019). The 
                                                             
5 CHSL, Milacron, Series: Executives Personal History (Schwartz), Box B-H, Folder Sol Einstein: Einstein, Sol, I do 
remember – men, machines, and the plants behind the Cincinnati Milling Machine Company, August 1972, p. 7. 
6 Greater Stuttgart (NUTS-2 level) is actually ranked fourteenth among the twenty regions of the European 
regions with a GDP per capita that is 50 percent or more above the EU average. See Eurostat news release 
52/2017. 
  
Prussian patent law, which is often referred to as exemplary for the German innovation system 
of the 19th century as a whole, was in fact rather the exception. Even if the very low patent fees 
give the impression that the Prussian legislator designed the patent system in a way that 
provided for many, also less wealthy inventors the opportunity to get patent protection, Prussian 
examination practice was rather restrictive. The Prussian patent inspectors rejected up to 90 
percent of the patent applications judging them not to meet the requirement of novelty and 
inventive ingenuity. While the Prussian patent law mirrored many characteristics of the 
American patent law, most German middle states such as Bavaria or Saxony decided to follow 
the British example and established only a weak examination procedure. As a result, patents 
per capita were much higher in these states than in Prussia. In the 1860s, for example, Saxony 
and Bavaria granted annually 70 and 20 patents per one million inhabitants respectively 
whereas the Prussian number came only to 3.6 (Donges/Selgert, 2019). 
Using the Bavarian patent legislation of 1825 as a model (Gehm, 2001, p. 87; 
Seckelmann, 2006, pp. 100-104), Wuerttemberg introduced its own patent rules within the trade 
act of 1828.7 The legislator especially copied the weak Bavarian examination procedure. That 
is why the patent authority of Wuerttemberg refused only about ten percent of all patent 
applications (Vischer, 1875, p. 498), which is in stark contrast to the Prussia rejection rate of 
90 percent. Notwithstanding the basic similarity with the Bavarian patent law, the patent system 
of Wuerttemberg also possessed some rather unique features that allowed for discriminating 
against foreigners. First, privileged access to information about inventions of third parties was 
provided for locals. In contrast to the current practices, under the patent law of Wuerttemberg, 
a patentee was generally not obliged to publish the description of his8 patent during its life span. 
Residents of Wuerttemberg, however, had the right to see the patent description in the last year 
before a patent finally expired.9 This privilege gave the locals a head start when it came to 
imitating an innovation which patent protection was elapsing. 
Another special feature of the patent law of Wuerttemberg was that the same patent fee 
did not apply to all patents. Instead, the patent authority was free to assign to each patent an 
individual fee that could range between five and twenty South German guilders per year.10 
Table 1 reveals that foreign inventors had to pay on average a much higher patent fee than the 
                                                             
7 See Allgemeine Gewerbe-Ordnung vom 5. Mai 1828, in: Regierungs-Blatt für das Königreich Württemberg vom 
Jahr 1828, pp. 237-286. The patent rules can be found under Articles 143 to 163. The revised trade act of 1836 
confirmed the patent legislation of 1828. See Articles 141 to 160 of the Revidierte allgemeine Gewerbe-
Ordnung vom 5. August 1836, in: Regierungsblatt für das Königreich Württemberg 1836, pp. 385-434. 
8 The use of the possessive proverb “his” indicates that, in the 19th century, most patents were held by male 
inventors. See Khan (2017). 
9 See Article 150 of the trade act of 1828. 
10 See Article 151 of the trade act of 1828. 
  
residents of Wuerttemberg did. Surprisingly, foreigners from non-German countries did not 
bear the highest patent fees. Instead, the extra financial burden was especially high for patentees 
who lived in German states that became not a member of the German Customs Union 
(Zollverein) founded in 1834 (Keller/Shiue, 2014; Ploeckl, 2015).11 Even inventors who resided 
within the borders of the Zollverein (but not in Wuerttemberg) had to pay a patent fee that was 
about 75 percent higher than the average patent fee of a resident from Wuerttemberg. 
 
Table 1 Average patent fee and life span of patents in Wuerttemberg, 1844-1868 
Patentees’ country of 
residence 
Annual patent fee Assigned life 
span 
Realized life 
span 
Wuerttemberg 7.0 fl 6.7 years 5.1 years 
German Customs Union 12.3 fl*** 5.1 years*** 3.9 years*** 
German states outside the 
Customs Union 
16 fl*** 6.2 years 4.3 years 
Non-German statesa 13.4 fl*** 5.1 years*** 3.9 years*** 
Total 9.8 fl 6.1 years 4.6 years 
 
a States that did not become part of the German Empire in 1871. 
Source: Own calculations based on patent fees were taken from the original letters patents that are shelved in the 
Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg. 
Note: Asterisks indicate whether the mean values are significantly different from Württemberg. Significance levels 
are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Differences in the average life span of patents were less pronounced. Inventors were 
allowed to suggest the life span of their patent, which could be held up to ten years,12 and, 
according to Gehm (2001, p. 157), the patent authority usually accepted their proposals. An 
inventor, however, was not forced to hold his patent until it expired but could give it up earlier 
when keeping it seemed no longer worth the annual patent fee. The fact that the ex-ante assigned 
life span was mostly longer than the ex-post realized life span suggests that inventors’ 
expectations about the future profitability of their inventions were often too optimistic.  
How did the patent administration explain the differences in patent fees? In a report, 
published in 1875, the patent authority of Wuerttemberg claimed to have been guided by two 
major principles when fixing patent fees in the last 25 years (Vischer, 1875, p. 495). The first 
principle applied to all inventors stipulating that the patent fee should increase with the expected 
profit the inventor would gain from his patent.13 
 
                                                             
11 We assigned states that joined the German Customs Union after 1834 to one of the other two groups until 
the date of their entry.  
12 See Article 149 of the trade act of 1828. For a similar procedure in Italy see Nuvolari/Vasta (2015). 
13 Lehmann-Hasemeyer/Streb (2016) show that investors at the Berlin stock exchange expected a corporation‘s 
profit to correlate positively with its patenting activities. 
  
Table 2 Little evidence for retaliation fees 
Country Fee for a full-term 
patent in ₤ 
Mean (stdv) annual 
patent fees in 
Wuerttemberg in fla 
Number of patents 
with information 
on fees 
Great Britain 180 15.7 (4.6) 15 
Austria 155 11.4 (4.8) 13 
Russia incl. Finnland 155 10.8 (4.9) 6 
Belgium 84 7.5 (3.5) 2 
Netherlands incl. 
Luxembourg 
62 10 (0) 2 
Spain 60 13.8 (2.5) 4 
France 60 14.8 (4.6) 70 
Italy 54 12.0 (5.7) 5 
USA 44 until 1861, 
7 afterwards 
11.3 (4.4) 8 
Bavaria (since 1853) 
incl. Palatine 
24 13.1 (4.8) 24 
Baden 15 9.3 (4.5) 30 
Saxony 11 15.0 (4.9) 24 
Hanover 9 15.0 (5.0) 3 
Wuerttemberg 
(average) 
8,5 7.0 (3.3) 389 
Sweden 8 10.0 (0.0) 2 
Hesse Nassau 6 8.8 (2.5) 4 
Hesse-Darmstadt 3 10,6 (6.4) 9 
Frankfurt/Main 2,5 14.0 (5.5) 5 
Kur Hesse (Hesse-
Kassel) 
1,5 15.0 (7.1) 2 
Prussia 0.4 12.7 (4.5) 98 
Hamburg 0 15.0 (7.1) 2 
Schleswig 0 20.0 (0.0) 1 
Switzerland 0 11,4 (5.0) 14 
 
a One British pound equaled 11.9 South German guilders. 
Sources: Andersson/Tell (2019, Table 1), Donges/Selgert (2019, Table 1), Lerner (2000, Table 3), Nicholas (2011, 
p. 331), Sáiz/Amengual (2018, Table 1). The patent fees of Austria were taken from the Kaiserliches Patent vom 
15. August 1852. Because of missing information, we excluded Algeria, Brunswick, Oldenburg, Sardinia and the 
Vatican State. Depending on the state-specific patent law “full-term” can mean ten or fifteen years. 
 
The second principle was only relevant for foreign patentees because it demanded that 
their patent fee should have been the higher the more a resident of Wuerttemberg had to pay to 
keep a patent in force in the foreign inventor’s country of origin. Similar to a trade war involving 
punitive tariffs, the patent authority apparently responded to high foreign patent fees for 
domestic inventors with high domestic patent fees for foreign ones.14 Table 2, however, did not 
show a clear-cut correlation between the patent fees in an inventor’s home country and the 
                                                             
14 Clemens and Williamson (2004) argue that in the 19th-century-world without international coordination 
raising tariffs to retaliate against an increase in foreign tariffs might have been a growth-enhancing activity. 
  
patent fees he had to remit in Wuerttemberg. Rather, it looks like patent holders from 
industrialized countries such as Great Britain, France or Saxony generally had to pay the highest 
patent fees. 
Before we will employ regression analysis to explore in more detail whether the patent 
authority actually followed the retaliation principle in administrative practice, we want to 
discuss two additional motives the patent authority might have had, even if it did not publicly 
admit it. The first motive is a fiscal one. The patent authority might have been tempted to raise 
patent fees for residents of wealthy foreign states in order to increase the state revenue in 
Wuerttemberg. We cannot rule out a revenue-generating patent policy, but doubt that the fiscal 
motive played a big role. Between 1849 and 1873, the Württemberg State took a sum total of 
60,000 South German guilders from patent fees (Vischer, 1875, p. 498), which corresponded 
to an annual average of less than 0.2 percent of total government revenue in this period 
(Mauersberg, 1988, p. 171). 
Finally, we need to clarify whether the patent authority might have had an interest in 
discriminating against foreign inventors. In Wuerttemberg, the patent authority was a sub-
committee of the so-called Centralstelle fuer Handel und Gewerbe which was founded to 
support the ministry of the interior in matters of promotion of trade and industry. Although this 
committee included civil servants, the majority of its members were local business men who 
had been elected to the post by their peers. Among these, the entrepreneur Ferdinand von 
Steinbeis stood out, who had dedicated himself to the industrialization of Wuerttemberg and 
headed the Centralstelle between 1856 and 1880.15 The descriptive statistics presented in 
Tables 1 and 2 raise the suspicion that the local business men around Steinbeis used their 
influence to push through comparatively high patent fees for foreign inventors in order to 
discourage them to acquire a patent in Wuerttemberg or, if they did, to keep it long. Because 
the patent fees of the individual patent documents were not made public, it was generally not 
easy to discover such a difference in treatment. Such a discriminatory strategy would have been 
illegal, however, if the foreign inventors resided within the borders of the Zollverein because, 
in 1842, Wurttemberg had committed itself by law to treat the inventors from the other countries 
of the Zollverein in the same way as its own subjects.16 On the level of the German Customs 
Union, Article 2 of the law of 1842 was a precursor of the principle of national treatment 
                                                             
15 Ferdinand Steinbeis’ (1807-1893) former career as an entrepreneur reached its peak in 1842 when he 
became managing director of the ironworks Stumm in Neunkirchen in the Saar region. As the head of the 
Centralstelle fuer Handel und Gewerbe, Steinbeis is especially credited for founding several trade schools. For a 
re-assessment of his lifetime achievement, see Kollmer-von-Oheimb-Loup (1998). 
16 See Article 2 of the Gesetz betreffend die Erfindungs- und Einführungspatente vom 29. Juni 1842 in 
Regierungsblatt für das Königreich Württemberg vom 8. Juli 1842. 
  
established in the Paris Convention of 1883. Whether the Patent authority of Wuerttemberg 
complied with this principle, we will research in the following sections. 
 
Figure 1 A historical letters patent from the year 1860 
 
Source: Landesarchiv Baden-Württemberg, Abteilung Staatarchiv Ludwigsburg E 170 a Bü 263 Bild 3. 
 
Data and identification strategy 
To find out whether patent fees were determined by the expected profitability of an 
innovation, retaliation, or discrimination, we need information about the individual patents.17 
An unpublished register compiled by Hans Peter Münzenmayer, which is held by the 
Wirtschaftsarchiv Baden-Württemberg, provides details about the 1,141 patents the state of 
Wuerttemberg granted between 1818 and 1868.18 These information include a patentee’s name 
and place of residence as well as a patent’s assigned and realized life span. Sometimes, a 
patentee’s occupation is also known. Based on its title, we assigned each patent to one of sixteen 
industries (from agriculture to building industry) (see Appendix Table A3). In addition, we 
hand-collected data about individual patent fees from the original letters patents that are shelved 
in the Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg. Information are available for 731 out of 972 patents that were 
granted between 1844 and 1868. If we compare the geographical distribution of patentees in 
our restricted sample of 731 patents with the one in the full sample, we find that differences are 
only small (see Appendix Table A2). The years from 1844 to 1868 cover most of the period in 
                                                             
17 Kollmer-von Oheimb-Loup (2016) gives an overview about patenting activities in Wuerttemberg between 
1818 and 1932. 
18 We do not consider the patents granted in Wuerttemberg after 1868 because the introduction of a nation-
wide patent law in 1877 distorted their assigned and realized life spans. 
  
which Wuerttemberg had promised not to discriminate against inventors from other member 
states of the German Customs Union. Figure 1 depicts a patent that was granted to the French 
inventor Jacques Belou from Paris in November 1860, who had invented a caloric machine. 
Belou had to pay the maximum annual patent fee of twenty South German guilders. The 
assigned life span of his patent was five years. 
Figure 2 shows that patenting activities were rather low until the end of the 1830s, 
stagnated at a slightly higher level in the 1840s and early 1850s, and began to rise substantially 
since the late 1850s. This development mirrors the economic development of Wuerttemberg 
whose industrialization gained momentum in the second half of the 19th century.19 
 
Figure 2 Newly granted patents in Wuerttemberg, 1818-1868 
 
Source: Münzenmayer (no date). 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the development of the patents’ assigned and realized average life 
span over time. We observe a downward trend of the average assigned life span in the 1840s 
and 1850s. At the first glance, this finding suggests that the patentees learned to form more 
realistic expectations with regard to the future economic performance of their inventions. The 
average realized life span, however, dropped even faster, which means that even shortened 
patent terms still turned out to be too optimistic. 
 
Figure 3 Assigned and realized life span of the patents granted in Wuerttemberg 
                                                             
19 See Kollmer-von Oheimb-Loup (2016), pp. 51-56. 
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The empirical fact that foreigners had to pay higher patent fees than inventors from 
Wuerttemberg does not automatically imply a case of systematic discrimination. Getting a 
foreign patent imposes additional costs in the form of expenses for patent lawyers and 
translators, fees for filing and renewing, and the longer-term costs of international disclosure 
of the underlying technology (Sáiz/Amengual, 2018). After weighing the costs and benefits of 
foreign patenting, most inventors therefore decide to file a patent only in their home country. 
Only their most promising innovations they will also patent abroad. That is why it is widely 
believed that foreign patents represent an especially valuable part of a country’s patent stock 
(Degner/Streb, 2013; Streb, 2016).20 This argument implies that the patents of Wuerttemberg 
that foreigners held were on average more valuable that the ones the residents possessed. If this 
was true, and the patent authority also did as it claimed and adjusted the patent fee to the 
expected profitability of an invention (see also Klostermann, 1876, p. 260), the higher patent 
fees foreigners had to remit might just indicate that they only brought their most valuable 
inventions to the market of Wuerttemberg. 
These considerations lead to an identification problem. Since the patent status “held by 
a foreigner” can indicate either an above-average economic value or a target of discrimination, 
we cannot use this information to control for the quality of patents when trying to identify the 
quantitative effect of the patent administration’s home bias. Fortunately, in patent systems like 
that of Wuerttemberg, where patent holders had to renew their patents annually by paying an 
additional fee, valuable patents can alternatively be identified by their realized life span 
(Schankerman/Pakes, 1986; Streb/Baten/Yin, 2006). In fact, legislators had deliberately 
introduced patent renewal fees in the hope that many patent holders who were not able to 
                                                             
20 Today, the so-called triadic patents that are simultaneously filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) are used to identify a 
country’s best innovations. 
  
profitably exploit their patents would give them up early and make the new knowledge that was 
documented in the patent file publicly usable long before the assigned patent duration would 
have elapsed. Figure 3 suggests that this mechanism worked as intended, as many inventors 
obviously decided to forego their patents before the end of their term. That is why we interpret 
a long realized life span of a patent as a reliable indicator of its comparatively high private 
economic value. 
Another way to identify the valuable patents of a historical patent population is to 
distinguish between patents of invention and patents of introduction. Patents of introduction 
were awarded to persons who introduced an innovation that was already successful abroad for 
the first time in Wuerttemberg. Originally, the person who applied for a patent of introduction 
did not need authorization by the original foreign inventor (Dölemeyer, 2015, p. 14).21 In 1842, 
however, this rule changed at least with respect to foreign inventors who lived in the German 
customs union. Formally accepting the new principle of national treatment, Wuerttemberg 
agreed on granting patents of introduction only to those persons who had already patented the 
invention in question in another member state of the German customs union.22 In the following 
years, the original inventor often teamed up with a resident of Wuerttemberg to apply for a 
patent of introduction. We assume that the patent authority assigned comparatively high patent 
fees to patents of introduction that protected inventions that had already proven their usefulness 
outside of Wuerttemberg. 
To conclude, we base our identification strategy on the idea of determining the 
profitability of a patent by means of its life span and its status as a patent of introduction. For 
the possibility of retaliation fees, we control by the respective patent fee structure (see Table 2) 
in the home country of the foreign patent holder. That part of the excessive patent fees of 
foreigners, which profitability and retaliation cannot explain, we interpret as discrimination. 
Thus, we estimate an OLS regression, in which the variable we aim at explaining are the annual 
patent fees. In addition to our main explanatory variables retaliation fee, life span and dummies 
for patents of introduction and for place of origin, we control for sectors fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, networks of inventors (number of co-inventors), experience of inventors (total 
number of patents), distance to the patent office and overall number of granted patents per 
year.23 The standard errors are clustered by sector. 
                                                             
21 Many backward countries that tried to catch up used this instrument. For the Spanish case see Sáiz/Pretel 
(2014). 
22 See Article 3 of the Gesetz betreffend die Erfindungs- und Einführungspatente vom 29. Juni 1842 in 
Regierungsblatt für das Königreich Württemberg vom 8. Juli 1842. 
23 For descriptive statistics, see Appendix Table A1. 
  
 
Table 3 Determinants of patent fee at the level of groups of countries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Patent fee (OLS) 
        
Life span (asigned)  0.358***  
  (0.0431)  
Life span (realised)   0.273*** 
   (0.0485) 
Customs Union (Zollverein) 4.453*** 4.837*** 4.705*** 
 (0.522) (0.486) (0.453) 
Other German state 8.611*** 8.357*** 8.847*** 
 (1.338) (1.252) (1.228) 
Non-German state 5.974*** 6.494*** 6.300*** 
 (0.418) (0.389) (0.396) 
Retaliation -0.00202 -0.00237 -0.00245 
 (0.00461) (0.00475) (0.00469) 
Patent of introduction 2.207*** 2.565*** 2.254*** 
 (0.714) (0.655) (0.657) 
Distance to Stuttgart 6.45e-06 3.95e-05 -8.39e-07 
 (0.000120) (0.000115) (0.000126) 
Number of patents by inventor 0.184 0.158 0.124 
 (0.169) (0.149) (0.160) 
Number of fellow inventors (by inventor) 0.182 0.198 0.211 
 (0.364) (0.330) (0.346) 
Patents per year 0.00952* 0.0336*** 0.0382*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00451) (0.00684) 
Constant 4.440*** 0.297 1.361* 
 (0.523) (0.613) (0.643) 
Year and sector dummies y y y 
Observations 712 712 712 
R-squared 0.497 0.521 0.513 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Empirical Results 
Table 3 shows that signs of discrimination against foreigners persist even if we control 
for profitability and retaliation. A German patentee, who lived outside the German Customs 
Union, had to pay a patent fee that was eight guilders higher than the one a resident of 
Wuerttemberg had to remit. A non-German patentee had to pay six guilders more, and even 
patentees from within the Zollverein, who were allegedly treated the same as locals, faced an 
excess patent fee of about 4.5 guilders. Regardless of this discriminatory treatment, the patent 
authority obviously took into account the expected profitability of the invention when 
calculating patent fees. A patent of introduction was about two guilders per year more expensive 
than a patent of invention, and the patent fee rose with both the assigned and the realized life 
  
span of a patent. We also tested the idea that an experienced inventor, who had successfully 
applied for other patents in the past or had a network of co-patentees, produced patents of a 
higher quality and was therefore charged higher patent fees. The two variables “Number of 
patents by inventor” and “Number of fellow inventors” turned out to be insignificant, however. 
Likewise, we did not find any statistical evidence for the claim that the patent authority 
retaliated against high patent fees abroad. Interestingly enough, the average patent fee was 
positively correlated with the number of patent application that occurred in the same year. This 
finding suggests that the patent authority raised patent fees when demand for patent protection 
was high and lowered them when there was need to raise the attractiveness of the local patent 
system. 
To investigate the suspicion that the patent authority of Wuerttemberg discriminated 
against inventors from selected countries we explicitly consider patentees’ countries of origin 
in Table 4. Obviously, the inventors from the most industrialized states of their time such as 
France and Great Britain, the Kingdom of Saxony, Bavaria including Palatinate (with an 
evolving innovative chemical industry (Streb/Baten/Yin, 2006)) and Prussia had to pay higher 
patent fees than patentees from backward states. The reason for this differentiation might have 
been similar to the one the American patent authority had before 1862 when charging especially 
high patent fees from British inventors: Local firms could profit the most from imitating 
unprotected innovations of the technologically most advanced countries. Surprisingly, the 
patent authority of Wuerttemberg gave American inventors the advantage of a comparatively 
low patent fee. We found no historical explanation for this preferential treatment and can 
therefore only speculate that Wuerttemberg was especially interested in attracting the American 
inventors to its own market. 
When controlling for individual countries of origin, we also identify a significant 
correlation between the patent fees in an inventor’s home country and the patent fees he had to 
remit in Wuerttemberg. This suggests that, after all, retaliation played a role when the patent 
office of Wuerttemberg determined patent fees for foreign inventors. In contrast to Table 3, 
Table 4 also provides some evidence that well-connected inventors produced inventions of 
higher quality whereas the number of patent application that occurred in the same year lost their 
significant impact on the patent fees. 
 
Table 4 Determinants of patent fee at the level of individual countries 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Patent fee (OLS) 
        
  
(mean) lenght_applied  0.359***  
  (0.0468)  
(mean) lenght_actual   0.260*** 
   (0.0453) 
Baden 0.509 0.821 0.895 
 (0.672) (0.625) (0.663) 
Bavaria incl. Palatine 4.849*** 5.204*** 5.109*** 
 (1.279) (1.130) (1.226) 
Prussia 3.891*** 4.160*** 4.034*** 
 (0.577) (0.475) (0.530) 
Hesse Darmstadt 2.897 3.440 3.395 
 (2.106) (2.109) (2.150) 
Kgd. Saxony 4.392*** 4.974*** 4.600*** 
 (1.070) (0.990) (0.978) 
Other german statesa 5.817*** 5.797*** 5.835*** 
 (1.802) (1.848) (1.760) 
England 3.384** 3.251** 3.212** 
 (1.221) (1.182) (1.162) 
France 4.802*** 5.173*** 5.024*** 
 (0.688) (0.596) (0.645) 
Russia -1.729 -2.073 -2.165 
 (2.037) (1.893) (1.924) 
Switzerland 4.383*** 4.658*** 4.446*** 
 (1.243) (1.221) (1.243) 
USA -18.88** -19.30*** -19.39** 
 (7.163) (6.355) (6.820) 
Austria 0.368 0.687 0.183 
 (1.469) (1.496) (1.486) 
Other non German statesb 1.874 2.432** 2.057* 
 (1.099) (1.052) (1.048) 
retaliation 0.00757 0.00908 0.00924 
 (0.00860) (0.00854) (0.00835) 
Retaliation 2.103*** 2.394*** 2.126*** 
 (0.693) (0.662) (0.646) 
Patent of introduction 2.406*** 2.533*** 2.480*** 
 (0.707) (0.626) (0.675) 
Distance to Stuttgart 0.263** 0.190** 0.176* 
 (0.101) (0.0823) (0.0981) 
Number of patents by inventor -0.0880 -0.0847 -0.0748 
 (0.331) (0.308) (0.321) 
Number of fellow inventors (by inventor) 0.0112 0.0372*** 0.0398*** 
 (0.00695) (0.00639) (0.00845) 
Patents per year 3.861*** -0.300 0.919 
 (0.554) (0.542) (0.638) 
Sector and year fixed effects y y y 
Observations 712 712 712 
R-squared 0.532 0.556 0.546 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by sector 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
a Here, we cover the German states for which we observe less than six patents. Frankfurt/Main, Hamburg, Hanover, 
Hesse Nassau, Kur Hesse (Hesse-Kassel), and Schleswig are concerned. 
b Here we cover non-German states for which we observe less than six patents. Belgium, Netherlands incl. 
Luxembourg, Italy, Spain, and Sweden are concerned. 
 
  
To find out whether comparatively high patent fees pushed foreign inventors out of the 
market of Wuerttemberg, we research the determinants of early patent termination. This is done 
by applying a logit regression, in which the dependent variable is equal to one, if the assigned 
life span is longer than the realized life span and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 5 Determinants of patent cancellation 
  (1) (2) (3) (6) 
VARIABLES cancelled cancelled cancelled cancelled 
     
        
Only if life span 
realized >2 
Patent fee   -0.0272 -0.0512 
   (0.0250) (0.0322) 
Life span (assigned)  0.151*** 0.171*** 0.275*** 
  (0.0243) (0.0237) (0.0381) 
Customs union (Zollverein) 0.408 0.581* 0.701* 0.454 
 (0.307) (0.331) (0.396) (0.475) 
Other German state 0.473 0.347 0.536 -0.382 
 (0.609) (0.558) (0.604) (1.319) 
Non-German state 0.250 0.450* 0.640* 1.160 
 (0.277) (0.272) (0.379) (0.741) 
Retaliation -0.000538 -0.000715 -0.000237 -0.00302 
 (0.00230) (0.00237) (0.00254) (0.00505) 
Patent of introduction -1.211*** -1.093** -0.936** -0.568 
 (0.438) (0.450) (0.441) (0.542) 
Distance to Stuttgart -0.000104 -8.74e-05 -9.55e-05 -6.51e-05 
 (8.57e-05) (8.82e-05) (9.10e-05) (0.000113) 
Number of patents by inventor -0.254 -0.294* -0.316** -0.316 
 (0.157) (0.164) (0.158) (0.212) 
Number of fellow inventors (by inventor) 0.147 0.161 0.140 -0.0778 
 (0.168) (0.171) (0.159) (0.180) 
Patents per year -0.00637 -0.00557 -0.00859 -0.0371 
 (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0336) 
Constant 0.667 -0.416 -0.00420 -0.230 
 (0.830) (0.789) (1.008) (2.840) 
Year and sector dummies y y y y 
Observations 747 747 706 481 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard error clustered by sector 
 
Table 5 provide slight evidence that inventors from the Zollverein and non-German 
states faced a higher probability to cancel their patents prematurely than those living in 
Wuerttemberg, but patent fees did not drive this result. However, the intention might have 
existed even if the desired effect of discrimination did not occur. The low cancellation rates of 
patents of introduction confirms our assumption that they presented more useful innovations 
  
than patents of invention. That the probability of cancellation is correlated positively with the 
assigned life span is a rather mechanical relationship: The longer the assigned life span, the 
more opportunities a patentee had to cancel his patent before the assigned term elapsed. 
 
Table 6 Determinants of assigned life span 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Life span assigned (OLS) 
  
Patent fee=20 
fl 
Patent fee=15 
fl 
Patent fee=10 
fl 
Patent fee=5 
fl 
Customs union (Zollverein) -2.255*** -3.881*** -1.859*** -1.507*** 
 (0.664) (0.855) (0.314) (0.445) 
Other German state -2.691 -6.355** -0.325  
 (1.629) (2.735) (1.516)  
Non-German state -3.314** -3.655* -2.662*** -0.954** 
 (1.209) (1.745) (0.438) (0.435) 
Retaliation 0.00553 -0.00136 0.00259 -0.00900 
 (0.00523) (0.0180) (0.00423) (0.00808) 
Patent of introduction -1.081* 1.027 -1.964*** -0.398 
 (0.590) (0.782) (0.330) (0.763) 
Distance to Stuttgart 5.96e-05 -8.79e-05 -0.000230** 5.66e-05 
 (0.000361) (0.000714) (8.95e-05) (4.72e-05) 
Number of patents by inventor -0.0869 -0.767* 0.0243 0.121 
 (0.188) (0.399) (0.196) (0.169) 
Number of fellow inventors (by 
inventor) 0.624 2.290 -0.284 0.112 
 (0.359) (3.086) (0.242) (0.275) 
Patents per year 0.0780** -0.0531 -0.0543*** -0.0929*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0497) (0.0126) (0.0117) 
Constant 4.409*** 16.20*** 12.17*** 12.25*** 
 (0.454) (3.513) (0.555) (0.200) 
Year and sector dummies y y y y 
Observations 94 54 272 289 
R-squared 0.596 0.798 0.420 0.237 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard error clustered by sector 
 
To support our main argument, we conclude with a (counter factual) thought experiment 
assuming that the assigned patent fees correctly reflected the value of the individual patents. If 
that were true, the patent authority could have only discriminated against foreigners by granting 
them a comparatively short patent term. To explore the determinants of the assigned life span, 
we divided the historical patent population into four sub groups according to their patent fees. 
The first sub group, for example, only contains patents with an assigned annual patent fee of 20 
guilders. Again, the coefficients are estimated with OLS and standard errors are clustered by 
  
sector. Table 6 reveals that, given a fixed patent fee, inventors who resided within the Zollverein 
or in a non-German state got a shorter assigned patent term than patentees from Wuertemberg 
did, meaning that their patent protection was weaker. 
 
Conclusions 
In the second half of the 19th century, Wuerttemberg was catching up to the more 
industrialized countries and became one of the most innovative regions throughout Europe. At 
the beginning of this development stands the reform of the state’s patent law that gave residents 
of the other member states of the German customs union the same formal rights as the local 
inventors already had. Scholars who like to stress the importance of institutions for economic 
growth might argue that the introduction of this particular set of inclusive institutions was an 
important precondition for the subsequent blossoming of innovative economic sectors such as 
machine building or car manufacturing in Wuerttemberg. Formal rules can be misleading, 
however. What often matters more is the hidden agenda of the public administration that is 
responsible for enforcing these rules. We have shown in this article that the patent authority of 
Wuerttemberg, whose majority were local business men, discriminated against foreign 
inventors from industrialized countries by charging comparatively high patent fees or assigning 
relatively short patent terms. 
If these discriminatory measures enabled local firms to imitate foreign technology faster 
than under fair conditions, the extractive use of formally inclusive institutions might have 
fostered economic development in Wuerttemberg. This tentative conclusion is in line with the 
argument by Boldrin and Levine (2008) who assume that the strict compliance to the 
international rules of law with respect to intellectual property rights will decelerate the speed 
of technological and economic progress in developing countries’ domestic industry. It stands 
in sharp contrast, however, to a recent claim by Donges and Selgert (2018) who suppose that 
the fair treatment of foreign inventors in Wuerttemberg’s neighboring state Baden increased 
the inflow of new knowledge into the state’s economy and therefore growth in the 19th century.  
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Appendix: 
 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Standard deviation 
Life span assigned 6.080631 2.479138 
Life span realized 4.624014 2.668152 
Patent fees 9.756131 5.048921 
Retaliation 19.98529 35.49695 
Patent of introduction 0.1428571 0.3501546 
Distance to Stuttgart 320.9121 915.9034 
Number of patents by inventor 1.370727 0.9119972 
Number of fellow inventors 1.134093 0.3956826 
Patents per year 54.39001 31.74904 
Cancelled 0.4189308 0.4936004 
Source: see text 
 
 
Table A2: Country of residence: full sample and sub sample, 1844-1868 
 
Sample for which we have 
information on fees 
Full sample of patents after 1844 
Patentees’ country of 
residence 
Total In percent Total In percent 
Wuerttemberg 381 52.7 537 55.25 
German Customs Union 196 27.11 254 26.13 
German states outside the 
Customs Union 
10 1.38 12 1.23 
Non-German states 136 18.81 169 17.39 
Total 723 100 972 100 
Source: see text 
  
  
Table A3: Assigned life span and annual patent fees by sector 
 
Assigned life span 
(1818-1868) 
Annual patent fee 
(1844-1868) 
Sector mean sd N mean sd N 
Agriculture 6.7 2.8 44 9.0 5.2 30 
Mining 10.0 
 
1 
  
0 
Food and beverages 6.1 2.4 110 9.2 5.1 69 
Textiles, clothes and shoes 6.1 2.5 197 10.8 5.6 132 
Paper 6.1 2.4 69 9.9 5.4 40 
Coke and oil 5.8 2.4 41 10.2 5.2 28 
Chemicals 6.4 2.5 94 12.1 4.4 55 
Stones 7.0 2.9 40 9.5 3.2 26 
Metal working 6.3 2.7 33 9.8 5.7 20 
Metal products 6.0 2.5 108 10.4 4.9 72 
Electricity 6.0 2.3 13 6.1 2.2 9 
Instruments and scientific apparatus 5.9 2.6 54 7.8 3.3 32 
Machines 5.6 2.0 150 9.2 4.7 111 
Cars 5.6 2.7 27 13.8 5.6 16 
Music, jewellery, medical instruments 6.2 2.4 143 7.1 3.7 82 
Construction 6.1 2.9 17 12.9 5.8 12 
Total 6.1 2.5 1141 9.8 5.0 734 
Source: see text 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
